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OPINION 
_____________________  
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 In 2004, Mark Manuel, Jr. (“Manuel”) pled guilty 
to mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371.  He was sentenced to prison followed by a 
three-year term of supervised release.  After being 
released from prison, Manuel repeatedly violated the 
conditions of his supervised release.  At a parole 
revocation hearing on July 26, 2012, Manuel informed 
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the District Court that he no longer wanted to be 
represented by counsel and instead wished to proceed pro 
se.  The District Court engaged in a colloquy with 
Manuel, during which the Court inquired into Manuel’s 
educational background, warned Manuel of the dangers 
in representing himself, and asked several questions 
about the reason for Manuel’s desire to proceed pro se.  
The District Court ultimately granted Manuel’s request to 
represent himself.  At an adjourned revocation hearing on 
November 5, 2012, at which Manuel presented witness 
testimony, the District Court revoked Manuel’s 
supervised release and sentenced him to two consecutive 
sixteen-month terms of imprisonment. 
 On appeal Manuel asks us to vacate the sentence 
imposed by the District Court and remand the matter for 
a new revocation hearing.  Relying heavily on our 
decision in United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120 (3d 
Cir. 2002), Manuel argues that the colloquy performed 
by the District Court regarding his request to proceed pro 
se was insufficient.  We disagree.  Peppers dealt with a 
defendant’s right to self-representation in a criminal 
prosecution—not a parole revocation hearing.  Following 
the test adopted by other courts of appeals, we hold that, 
in the context of a hearing regarding the revocation of 
supervised release, the appropriate test is whether the 
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived 
representation by counsel.  Based on the record before us, 
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we find that the totality of the circumstances shows that 
Manuel made a knowing and voluntary decision to 
represent himself.  Consequently, we will affirm the 
District Court. 
I. 
A. Manuel’s Fraud Offenses and Conviction 
 Between July 2000 and November 2001, Manuel 
and a co-conspirator fraudulently solicited membership 
interests in a variety of programs owned and operated by 
Manuel.1  Manuel represented to potential investors—
most of whom were low- or moderate-income individuals 
seeking help purchasing or refinancing their homes—
that, in exchange for payment of a membership fee 
(ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars), 
Manuel’s programs would provide assistance with debt 
consolidation, mortgage refinancing, and obtaining loans 
from banks.  Manuel and his co-conspirator did not 
provide these benefits to the investors.  Instead, 
unbeknownst to the investors, Manuel and his co-
conspirator used the funds received from the investors for 
                                                 
1 These programs included the Future Millionaire’s Club, 
Manuelabor.com, Get-A-Crib.com, S.E.E.E.D. (Spiritual 
Empowerment Equals Economic Development) 
Consortium, MWM Enterprises d/b/a 4M Limited, and 
Debt Pool. 
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their own personal benefit. 
 On November 12, 2003, a grand jury in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted 
Manuel on four counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1341, and one count of conspiracy to commit 
mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, in connection 
with this scam.  On May 11, 2004, Manuel pled guilty to 
one count of mail fraud and the count of conspiracy to 
commit mail fraud.  On October 26, 2004, the Eastern 
District of Virginia sentenced Manuel to seventy-one 
months in prison, followed by a three-year term of 
supervised release.  As one condition of his supervised 
release, Manuel was required to refrain from any 
unlawful drug use and ordered to undergo periodic drug 
testing as directed by his probation officer.  He also was 
prohibited from self-employment and from working in 
occupations where he would have access to personal or 
financial information during the period of supervised 
release. 
B. Manuel’s Repeated Violations of the Terms of 
Supervised Release  
 In December 2008, Manuel was released from 
prison and commenced his term of supervised release.  
On June 15, 2009, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
accepted a transfer of jurisdiction over Manuel’s 
supervised release from the Eastern District of Virginia 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3605.  Between 2009 and 2011, 
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Manuel repeatedly violated the conditions of his 
supervised release by, among other things, failing 
numerous drug tests.  After a revocation hearing on 
March 10, 2011, the District Court revoked Manuel’s 
supervised release and imposed a sentence of two 
concurrent terms of eight months in prison, followed by 
two concurrent terms of twenty-four months of 
supervised release. 
 On October 24, 2011, Manuel was released from 
prison and commenced his second term of supervised 
release.  On November 2, 2011 and February 6, 2012, 
Manuel again submitted urine specimens that tested 
positive for cocaine.  Additionally, during a routine home 
visit on February 7, 2012, Manuel’s probation officer 
discovered flyers advertising a debt-reduction seminar 
that Manuel had organized, which constituted a violation 
of the conditions of Manuel’s supervised release barring 
him from engaging in self-employment and participating 
in employment where he would have access to personal 
or financial information.   
 To address these ongoing drug violations, the 
District Court modified the conditions of Manuel’s 
supervised release and ordered him to reside in a 
residential reentry center for a period of 120 days.  While 
confined to the residential reentry center, Manuel 
continued to commit additional loan fraud offenses.  A 
victim, Kathryn Williams (“Williams”), reported to 
Manuel’s parole officer, Kyle Watts (“Watts”), that in 
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April 2012, Manuel had recruited her to participate in an 
organization called the “Women’s Opportunity 
Organization,” which he claimed was created to provide 
financial assistance to single women, and had convinced 
Williams to give him $500 for membership in another 
organization, the “NEMA Financial Empowerment 
Association,” in exchange for the promise to secure a 
$300,000 home loan for her.  See Report of Violation of 
Supervised Release dated June 11, 2012, Supplemental 
Appendix 28–29.  Additionally, Watts learned that, on or 
around May 24, 2012, Manuel solicited other residents of 
the reentry center to pay money to one of his 
organizations and promised these residents that in return 
they would receive profits and assistance with debt 
reduction, restructuring mortgages, and obtaining and 
refinancing home loans.  Id. at Supplemental Appendix 
30. 
C. Manuel’s Revocation Hearing and Request to 
Proceed Pro Se 
 On June 11, 2012, the District Court issued a 
warrant for Manuel’s arrest and signed a petition seeking 
revocation of supervised release.  At a preliminary 
hearing on June 15, 2012, Manuel stipulated to probable 
cause and detention pending his final revocation hearing. 
 The District Court held an initial revocation 
hearing on July 26, 2012.  At this hearing, the 
government presented evidence of Manuel’s violations of 
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the conditions of supervised release, including testimony 
by Manuel’s probation officer and testimony by Williams 
and her mother about Manuel’s efforts to solicit 
Williams’ participation in the Women’s Opportunity 
Organization and NEMA Financial Empowerment 
Association.   
 After these witnesses were cross-examined by 
Manuel’s counsel, Regina Coyne, Esq. (“Ms. Coyne”), 
and the government had concluded presenting its 
evidence, Manuel informed the District Court that he no 
longer wanted to be represented by Ms. Coyne and 
instead wished to proceed pro se.  The District Court 
engaged Manuel in the following colloquy about his 
request, during which the Court questioned Manuel 
about, among other things, his educational background 
and lack of familiarity with court rules, his reasons for 
wanting to represent himself, and the strategic 
disadvantages of proceeding pro se: 
 THE COURT:  So, sir, how old are you? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  I am fifty-four 
years old. 
 THE COURT:  And how far did you go 
in school? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Four years of 
college. 
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 THE COURT:   And where did you go to 
college? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Indiana 
University, Wilmington [sic], Indiana. 
 THE COURT:  You need to speak 
louder.  So you completed your academic 
program but if I remember correctly, since 
you had an outstanding tuition bill, you 
didn’t get your degree, is that correct? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Degree, yes. 
Thank you. 
 THE COURT:   Do you have any drugs 
or alcohol in your system today? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  No, I do not. 
 THE COURT:  And do you have any 
mental health problems today or have you 
had any in the past? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  No, I do not. 
 THE COURT:  And tell me what you got 
your degree in? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Business 
administration and management. 
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 THE COURT:  All right.  So you did not 
go to any post-grad -- or post-graduate 
program of any sort, is that correct? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  No, sir. 
 THE COURT:  And -- am I correct, is that -- 
 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 THE COURT:  And it would be fair to 
say that you do not have any legal training, 
is that also correct? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  That is correct. 
 THE COURT:  It would be fair to say 
that you haven’t gone to law school? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  That is correct. 
 THE COURT:  So you obviously 
understand this is a court of law with very 
clear and established rules and procedures -- 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir. 
 THE COURT:  -- correct? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 THE COURT:  And you’re one who 
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does not have legal training.  You would be 
bound by the rules and the procedures, do 
you understand that? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 THE COURT:  There may be certain 
things that you want to say that could be 
useful.  But because you’re not legally 
trained, you wouldn’t think of them, right?  
So you may miss things because you’re not 
legally trained.  Do you understand that? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
 THE COURT:  There may be objections 
to some of the government’s questions.  And 
because you’re not legally trained, you 
might not be able to know to object.  Do you 
understand that? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
 THE COURT:  All right.  But if you -- 
you, of course, have the absolute right to 
represent yourself if that’s your wise and 
informed choice.  You understand that? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
 THE COURT:  But if you represent 
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yourself, you would be the lawyer.  She 
would serve only in a back-up capacity.  
There wouldn’t be any switching back and 
forth.  Your representation would have to be 
total and complete.  Do you understand that? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 THE COURT:  You understand 
everything I have said to you about this? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
 THE COURT:  Do you have any 
questions about any of it? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  No.  Just apologize 
beforehand if I make any errors. 
 THE COURT:  Well, if you make errors, 
they’re yours. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Okay. 
 THE COURT:  Right?  Because I would 
advise you -- 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Well, but -- 
 THE COURT:  Excuse me.  I would 
advise you to keep your lawyer. That’s what 
I would advise you.  I have not seen ever a 
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defendant who’s benefitted himself by self-
representing.  Ever.  May you be the first, 
but I doubt it.  I would advise you to keep 
your lawyer.  So why do you want to get rid 
of her? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Sir, because, first 
of all, I believe that there have been certain 
due process and procedural errors in this 
entire venue with respect to my sentencing, 
with respect to the documentation that I 
received from the probation officer, with 
respect to my disposition, the amount of 
imprisonment time, the amount of 
supervised release time that I had, the 
allegations concerning -- I was placed in a 
halfway house because of suspicion of doing 
business when it was for -- I agreed to 
modification because of drug use.  There has 
been no -- 
 THE COURT:  Sir, I have an entire file -
- 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Sure. 
 THE COURT:  -- for you even though 
this is a case transferred from Virginia.  I 
probably have eight or ten reports from the 
probation department. 
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 THE DEFENDANT:  Okay. 
 THE COURT:  And so, I am very 
familiar with – and I can measure 
independently what Mr. Watts tells me.  But 
you’re explaining to me why you do not 
want to be represented by Ms. Coyne.  So 
tell me why you don’t want to be 
represented by her. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Because, number 
one, I believe that I should be able to 
confront all my witnesses.  And her 
speaking on behalf of her daughter, even 
though that’s her daughter, I don’t believe 
that that’s in my best interest.  Number two -
-  
 THE COURT:  We’re not in a trial 
proceeding.  This is a revocation hearing.  
And hearsay is admissible and you would 
know it if you were a lawyer. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Well -- 
 THE COURT:  Hearsay is admissible.  
And then, secondly, there’s a question of 
weight, right -- 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Correct. 
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 THE COURT:  -- that I would assume to 
the evidence.  And this is the disadvantage 
you have because you’re not a lawyer. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Right.  Yes.  I 
understand hearsay is admissible but also I 
have the right to confront an adverse 
witnesses [sic] against me, sir.  And just like 
she --  
 THE COURT:  Your right to 
confrontation applies to revocation 
proceedings in the same way that it applies 
to a trial, yes or no?  Don’t know, do you. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yeah, based on 
Morrissey v. Brewer, it says yes – yes, it is.  
And I have the case right here. 
 THE COURT:  Give me the facts in 
Morrissey.  That’s from the ‘60s, right? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  No.  It’s from ’72. 
 THE COURT:  ‘70s.  I meant it was old.  
And if you’re going to read from the 
document that you submitted, I guess it was 
last week, I’ve already read that. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  No.  No.  I was 
going to -- 
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 THE COURT:  You’re going to read 
from something else? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  I’m sorry? 
 THE COURT:  You’re going to read 
from something else? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  I’m going to 
read from the exact case itself, Morrissey v. 
Brewer. 
 THE COURT:  Are you going to read 
from Morrissey? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 THE COURT:  Okay.  I don’t need you 
to read Morrissey to me. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Well, I was just 
going to read the part about what due 
process and what respect to supervised 
release revocation hearings, just that one 
part -- 
 THE COURT:  Okay. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  -- about being able 
to confront adverse witnesses. 
 THE COURT:  Fine.  Go ahead.  Read 
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what you want to read. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  If you’ll bear with 
me. 
(Pause) 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Okay.  It says 
basically with respect to preliminary -- 
 MS. COYNE:  You’ve got the wrong 
one. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Okay.  “On 
request of the parolee, a person who has 
given adverse information on which parole 
revocation is to be based is to be made 
available for questioning in his presence.” 
 THE COURT:  So why else do you want 
to terminate her as your lawyer? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Well, sir -- 
 THE COURT:  Well, you know what?  I 
could just tell you right now.  Ms. Williams, 
the daughter, I am disregarding all of her 
information.  All right? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Okay. 
 THE COURT:  I am not accepting it for 
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the truth of the matter.  I’m only accepting it 
as the route that this case -- 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Oka.  [sic] 
 THE COURT:  -- traveled to get in front 
of me. 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Okay. 
 THE COURT:  So go ahead.  What else 
do you want to say? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Well, 
understanding exactly what you said, the 
witness that is here, she basically stated in 
the documentation that I received from 
probation that she met me outside of a 
convenience store soliciting. 
 THE COURT:  Sir, I can’t talk you out 
of self-representing.  Is that where we’re 
going?  You want to represent yourself? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Well, I want 
certain questions to be -- 
 THE COURT:  Yes or no?  Do you want 
to represent -- 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
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 THE COURT:  Okay.  Do you want her 
to serve in a backup capacity? 
 THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
 THE COURT:  All right.  Any other 
questions either of the lawyers think I need 
to ask? 
 MS. CRAWLEY:  No, Your Honor. 
 MS. COYNE:  No, Your Honor. 
 THE COURT:  You’ve done a lot of 
foolish type things in your life, sir.  This 
might be the most foolish you’ve ever done.  
That’s my advice to you.  But if you want to 
do it, I don’t have legal authority to stop 
you.  All right. 
Transcript of Hearing Regarding Violation of Supervised 
Release, Appendix 55–62.  The District Court granted 
Manuel’s motion to proceed pro se and allowed him to 
retain Ms. Coyne as standby counsel. 
 Manuel represented himself for the remainder of 
the July 26 hearing and, at the close of the hearing, 
requested a continuance in order to serve subpoenas and 
present additional witnesses.  The Court granted the 
request.  At an adjourned revocation hearing on August 
27, 2012, Manuel requested, and was granted, another 
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continuance of sixty days.  On November 5, 2012, the 
District Court held a third revocation hearing, at which 
Manuel presented witness testimony from his substance 
abuse therapist and employees of the residential reentry 
center.  At the conclusion of the November 5th 
revocation hearing, the District Court found Manuel in 
violation of his supervised release and imposed the 
statutory maximum sentence of sixteen months on each 
of the two terms of release, to be served consecutively, 
for a total sentence of thirty-two months.  This timely 
appeal followed.2 
II. 
 Manuel asks us to vacate the sentence imposed by 
the District Court and remand the matter for a new 
revocation hearing.  Manuel argues that the colloquy 
performed by the District Court regarding Manuel’s 
request to represent himself at the revocation hearing was 
inadequate, thus rendering his waiver of his right to 
counsel ineffective.  We disagree. 
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over the criminal 
offenses for which Manuel was convicted pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 and had jurisdiction over the revocation of 
Manuel’s supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(e).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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A. The Standard of Review  
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
finding that a defendant in a criminal prosecution 
knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel.  
United States v. Booker, 684 F.3d 421, 425 (3d Cir. 
2012).  The government argues, citing United States v. 
Jackson, 443 F.3d 293, 300–01 (3d Cir. 2006), and other, 
non-precedential authority, that because Manuel failed to 
interpose an objection to the colloquy conducted by the 
District Court, we should apply a plain error standard of 
review.  Manuel, by contrast, urges us to apply plenary 
review.  We find that even under the more stringent 
plenary review, the District Court committed no error 
with regard to Manuel’s waiver of counsel. 
B. The Standard for Determining the Efficacy of a 
Defendant’s Waiver of  Counsel at a Revocation 
Hearing 
 The right to counsel in a criminal prosecution 
embodied in the Sixth Amendment carries with it the 
corollary right to proceed pro se.  Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 819–21 (1975).  Before being permitted to 
waive the right to counsel in favor of self-representation, 
a defendant in a criminal prosecution must be made 
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding 
pro se and must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
forego the benefits of representation by counsel.  Id. at 
835 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 
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(1938)).  Recognizing the fundamental importance of this 
constitutional right, we have made clear that in a criminal 
prosecution, the trial court bears “the weighty 
responsibility of conducting a sufficiently penetrating 
inquiry to satisfy itself that the defendant’s waiver of 
counsel is knowing and understanding as well as 
voluntary.”  United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 
130–31 (3d Cir. 2002).  To assist in conducting this 
inquiry, we set forth a framework in Peppers containing 
fourteen questions for the court to ask the criminal 
defendant in order to assure the court that the defendant’s 
decision to proceed pro se is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  Id. at 136–37.  See also United States v. 
Jones, 452 F.3d 223, 228–29 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The 
purpose of the inquiry is to establish that the defendant: 
(1) has ‘clearly and unequivocally’ asserted his desire to 
represent himself; (2) ‘understands the nature of the 
charges, the range of possible punishments, potential 
defenses, technical problems that [he] may encounter, 
and any other facts important to a general understanding 
of the risks involved’; and (3) is competent to stand 
trial.”) (quoting Peppers). 
 However, Peppers applies only to a defendant’s 
request to proceed pro se in a criminal prosecution.  A 
parole revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution.  
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (“[T]he 
revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal 
prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a 
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defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole 
revocations.”).  Accordingly, there is no constitutional 
right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation 
hearing.  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783–90 
(1973).  Thus, the fourteen-point inquiry set forth in 
Peppers is not the appropriate standard for determining 
the sufficiency of a colloquy performed by an examining 
court in response to a defendant’s request to proceed pro 
se at a revocation hearing. 
 Although a defendant at a revocation hearing does 
not have a constitutional right to counsel, a revocation 
hearing nonetheless presents the risk of a loss of liberty 
and thereby triggers the requirements of due process in 
general.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484; Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
at 781–82.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 was 
promulgated to address these due process concerns.  See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1; see also United States v. Barnhart, 
980 F.2d 219, 222 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that these due 
process requirements were incorporated into Rule 32.1 
following Morrissey and Scarpelli).  However, Rule 32.1 
does not address the appropriate standard by which to 
assess a defendant’s waiver of the Rule’s protections. 
 We have not had occasion to speak to this issue in 
a precedential opinion—however, several of our sister 
circuits have addressed it and we consider their reasoning 
persuasive.  We expressly adopt the standard set forth in 
those decisions: that, in order for due process to be 
satisfied in the context of a parole revocation hearing, the 
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defendant’s waiver of rights under Rule 32.1 must be 
knowing and voluntary under a “totality of the 
circumstances.”  See United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 
646, 651–52 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Correa-
Torres, 326 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. 
LeBlanc, 175 F.3d 511, 515–17 (7th Cir. 1999).  This 
standard does not require “rigid or specific colloquies 
with the district court.”  Hodges, 460 F.3d at 651.  
Rather, “the district court, when confronted with an 
attempted waiver, will advise . . . the person on 
supervised release of both the rights afforded him . . . and 
the consequences of relinquishing those rights.”  Id. at 
651–52 (citing Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d at 23).  No 
“particular mantra” is necessary and no “magic words” 
are required for the district court to be satisfied that the 
defendant’s waiver is knowing and voluntary.  Id. at 652.  
On appellate review where the defendant on supervised 
release challenges the validity of the waiver of counsel, 
the reviewing court should examine “the totality of the 
attendant circumstances [including] evidence that sheds 
light upon the target’s comprehension of the charges 
against him and evidence as to his appreciation of the 
nature of the rights afforded him by Rule 32.1.”  Id. 
C. The Totality of the Circumstances Demonstrates 
that Manuel’s Waiver of  Counsel Was Knowing and 
Voluntary 
 We are satisfied that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, Manuel’s waiver of counsel at his 
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revocation hearing was knowing and voluntary.  Manuel 
was aware of the nature of the charges against him and 
the severity of the penalties that he faced.  Although he 
had no legal training, Manuel demonstrated familiarity 
with the criminal process and the procedures surrounding 
revocation of his supervised release.  Manuel explicitly 
acknowledged that he was aware that the revocation 
hearing operated on technical rules and procedures and 
that, as a non-lawyer, he may not raise appropriate 
objections or make relevant arguments.  The District 
Court also specifically warned him of the strategic 
disadvantages of proceeding pro se, advised him that he 
would bear responsibility for any technical or strategic 
errors that he might make while representing himself, and 
strongly recommended that he keep Ms. Coyne as his 
counsel rather than proceed pro se.  Finally, there is 
nothing to suggest that Manuel’s waiver was the product 
of coercion or gamesmanship and nothing to suggest that 
this decision was anything other than Manuel’s voluntary 
and informed choice. 
III. 
 For the reasons stated above, we hold, as have our 
sister circuits, that a defendant’s waiver of the rights 
afforded by Rule 32.1 is effective where it is knowingly 
and voluntarily made.  In a parole revocation hearing, a 
defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel is effective 
where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that 
the defendant’s waiver of counsel was made knowingly 
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and voluntarily.  Based on the record evidence before us, 
we conclude that the totality of the circumstances 
demonstrates that Manuel’s waiver of his counsel was 
knowing and voluntary.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
 
